Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts

Saturday, June 9, 2012

Facebook Users in Arab Countries

This morning, I came across two infographics by Khaled El Ahmed (@Shusmo) depicting the penetration of the social networking platforms Facebook and Twitter in the Arab countries. The data used in these infographics were gathered from the Arab Social Media Report conducted by the Dubai School of Government. 

This particular study examines the demographics of Facebook usage within the frameworks of the growth rate of users, the gender breakdown, and how individual nations try to regulate access to platforms. In addition, the study considers factors such as income, youth population, and internet freedom. 

The study also looks into the future. What does a large number of young people using social networking platforms mean for cvic engagement, social reform, entrepreneurship, and innovation?

A few notes taken directly from the study:
  • On a global level, the UAE is the top Arab country in terms of Facebook penetration as percentage of the population. It is also among the top 10 in the world, with a Facebook penetration rate of 45%
  • GCC countries dominate the top five Arab FB users as percentage of population, with Lebanon being the only exception.
  • With around 4.7 million Facebook users, Egypt constitutes about 22% of total users in the Arab region.
  • Youth (between the ages of 15 and 29) make up 75% of Facebook users in the Arab region.
  • Gender breakdown of Facebook users indicates an average 2:1 ratio of male to female users in the Arab region, compared to almost 1:1 globally
  • Lebanon is the most gender-balanced of the Arab countries, followed closely by Bahrain, Jordan and Tunisia, while at the other end of the spectrum Facebook users in Somalia and Yemen are overwhelmingly male 
  • The UAE is the most balanced in terms of adult and youthful Facebook users, while countries such as Somalia, Palestine and Morocco have a predominantly youthful Facebook user population
  • Interestingly, a few Arab countries (Djibouti, Iraq) actually have more Facebook users than Internet users, indicating that many Facebook users in these countries rely on mobile access
  • Internet freedom does not seem to affect Facebook penetration in the Arab region. Some countries with lower scores (i.e., more pervasive filtering) have relatively high Facebook penetration. This could be due to the creativity of the youth population in finding ways to bypass filters and censors.

Friday, June 8, 2012

Still Shouting in the Dark #Bahrain

While I followed the anti-government protests closely at their onset, I, like many, became tired of attending countless lectures by professors and guest speakers in Ann Arbor. However, I think the success of Egypt's ability to televise a presidential debate, hold legitimate elections, and the suspense of this month's run-off elections -- has rekindled the interest of many who follow Middle Eastern affairs. When we know that an end is possible -- inshallah --, it becomes worthy to understand the means.

As I found myself more active on Twitter this week, I've noticed many tweets about the continuing situation in Bahrain. I was very interested particularly in the Bahraini protests, because they challenge the reasoning that the wealthy GCC nations have no need to reform their governments, since they are materially content.

At its onset, the Bahraini effort was intent on equality for the Shi'a majority living under the reign of Sunni King Hamad. However, the government was relentless in its approach to the civil uprising centered in Pearl Roundabout. The result was a nation under "martial law."

Better than my words, the Al Jazeera documentary "Bahrain: Shouting in the Dark" provides an excellent testimony to this desperate time.

One aspect of this documentary that I found exceptionally provoking was the manner in which the government used the momentum of social media against the protestors. The government aggregated photos available on platforms such as Facebook and used its sources to identify individuals participating in "illegal protests." These individuals were later jailed or killed.

But why am I writing this post today? Even though King Hamad commissioned an independent inquiry  into the happenings, he does not seem to abide by any of the findings. The commission found that the government itself was guilty of human rights violations and various types of torture. The commission also stated that the roots of the uprisings were not from Iran -- which the government accuses of rallying Shi'as in Bahrain as treasonous puppets of the Iranian regime.

Throughout the week, I've been following the tweets of @angryarabiya and @MaryamAlKhawaja (of Bahrain Center for Human Rights). I keep coming across a myriad of accounts of arrests and teargas used on protesters. In particular, I read of a number of children under the age of 16 being arrested for taking part in protests.
As I needed to find out more about this resurfacing of the political crackdown in Bahrain, I checked Al Jazeera hoping to find a story about Bahrain hidden in some corner -- but it was a headline story!
So what does this mean? While the world is busy with election anxiety in Egypt and Assad's daily efforts to transform Syria into a big slaughterhouse -- Bahrainis are still shouting in the dark. No one is holding the King accountable, for there is too much at risk. The Bahraini monarchy's relationship with their fellow Sunnis in Saudi Arabia is close as we saw KSA sent tanks to Bahrain last March. In effect, this creates two camps from a geopolitical perspective -- one centered around Saudi Arabia, the other around Iran.

However, USA Today reports on the United States' attempts to persuade King Hamad to appease Shi'a demands, without stepping on the toes of the Saudis:
Bahrain's rulers have crucial support from neighboring Saudi Arabia, but are under pressure from their U.S. allies to reopen dialogue with Shiite opposition factions. A new government initiative for talks is expected to be announced next week. But main Shiite groups have already signaled that negotiations are futile unless the ruling dynasty agrees to give up its near total control of government affairs in the strategic island, which is home to the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet.
Finally, Shi'as in Bahrain want to make clear that being Shi'a does not mean association with Iran. Similarly, not all Sunnis see their country as another province of Saudi Arabia. Rather, by protesting they are more intently expressing their desires to participate in the civil culture of their own nation.
"No to the unification of the GCC; Yes to the unification of the opposition powers!"
"Bahrain is not for sale!"

Monday, June 4, 2012

كيف قررت دراسة العربية؟


كيف قررت دراسة العربية؟
بقلم نكهل نندگم

لماذا قررت دراسة العربية؟ في الحقيقة هذا السؤال ممتاز. من البداية ما كانت هناك ايّ علاقة بيني وبين هذه اللغة. لم اختر العربية بسبب اصل عائلتي مثل بعض الطلاب في صفي ولم اختر العربية بسبب اشتراكي في الجيش مثل مجموعة اخرى. فما كان سبب اهتمامي بهذه اللغة وثقافتها؟ هذا السؤال ممتع جدا خاصةً لانّ العربية هي لغة معروفة في الدنيا كلها بسبب صعوباتها – يعني قرار دراسة اللغة العربية ليس مثل قرار دراسة الفرنسية او الاسبانية. بالنسة للغة العربية هي لغة غير معروفة للامريكيين. فكيف سوف نستعمل هذه اللغة وكيف سوف نقرب عن ثقافتها. هذه الاسئلة ليست سهلة بضبط ولكن هي مهمة جدا في نظر الطلاب الجدد. فبعد سنتين في صفوف العربية في جامعة مشيغان اريد ان احكي لكم قصتي

من كل اللغات الموجودة في العالم لماذا اخترت العربية؟ بدأت ان اهتم باللغة العربية في المرحلة الثانوية. كانت عطلة الشتاء عندما تعلمت عن الموسيقى العربية الشعبية. في الحقيقة الاستمع الى هذا النوع من الموسيقى غيّر حياتي. اوّلاً استكشاف هذا الموسيقى غيّر افكاري عن الشرق الاوسط والعرب. في الغرب نظن انّ كل العرب محافظون ودينيون ونظن على خطأ انّ كل العرب مسلمون ايضا. فتعلمت كيف افكارنا عن الشرق الاوسط غير صحيحة

في هذه السنوات كنت ادرس لغات اخرى ايضا. درست الفرنسية في مدرسة واشتريت كتابا وبدأت ان ادرس اللغة الهندية والأردو جنبا الى جنب. استمتعت بدراسة هذه اللغات لأنّها لغات الافلام الهندية. تعلمت انّ هناك علاقة قريبة بين مفردات موجودة في هذه اللغات والكلمات العربية والفارسية. فكانت هذا اللحظة الالى فكرت ان ادرس اكثر عن اللغات في الشرق الاوسط

في هذا الزمان كانت الولايات المتحدة مشغولة في حربين وكنت اسكن في مدينة محافظة بالنسبة للسياسة ومسيحية شديدا بالنسبة للدين. وفي رايي ما عرفوا كثيرا عن الثقافات المختلفة في الدنيا. كانوا يعتقدون انّ كل عرب او كل مسلم خطير وعنيف. لذلك اردت ان اغيّر وجهة نظرهم. اردت ان اقدم لهم صورة مختلفة الشرق الاوسط. عندما قدمت لأصدقاء كليبات اغاني العربية استغربت الاغلبية. ربما هذه الكليبات كانت غريبة لأنّها كانت على العكس من ما يشاهد الامريكيون في الاخبار او على العكس من ما يسمع الامريكيون في خطبة الرئيس الامريكي. فأهم شيء بالنسبة لهذا سوء الفهم هو ليس ان كل الامريكيين يكرهون العرب، ولكن في رايي ليست لهم فرصة ان يفهموا حقيقة ثقافة واجتماع العرب بطريقة مناسبة


لذلك انا فعلا مبسوط ان اتعلم دراسة اللغة والثقافة العربية في برنامج فلاگشب. مع مساعدة هذا البرنامج من السهل ان نقرب من العالم العربي وصوته. مثلاً التقينا اشخاص مؤثرين مثل توكل كرمان وهالة البدري وزهور كرام وبثينة كامل حتى يمكننا الآن ان نتعلم من مصادر الاخبار. فدراسة اللغة العربية تعطينا وصول المعلومات المهمة من اصلها ونصبح مستعدين ان نقرر بين الحقيقة والكذبة. اخيرا في رأيي هذه القوة اللغوية هي قوة كبيرة ومن اللازم ان نستفيد منها لنحقق مقاصدنا 

مع استاذة توكل كرمان --  حاصلة على جائزة نوبل للسلام ٢٠١١

Monday, April 30, 2012

Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind: Survival by Reform

Introduction

The beginnings of the Jamaat-e-Islaami and the roots of its pre-Partition ideology can be traced directly to the ideology of Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi. As one of the most prolific figures of the twentieth century, Mawdudi was critical in the development of Islam as a potent force in the era of post-British South Asia. Once Independence was won and Partition took place, Mawdudi and his JeI reorganized in Lahore, Pakistan under the name JeI Pakistan, while the organization's Indian counterparts took the name JeI Hind (Moten 180). This paper seeks to examine the ultimate objectives and methods administered by Jamaat-e-Islaami in India – Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind (JIH). The Jamaat is established across South Asia in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Kashmir. However, India is the only minority-Muslim nation in which it is present. How does JIH trace its evolution from the days of hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah and Mawdudiyat in the 1940s to its formation of a secular political party in 2011? How has JIH negotiated its identity and legitimacy in order to own policy space, especially in a secular nation in which Muslims are a small minority. And how does the secular and largely Hindu-background of the Indian state react to the nation's most prominent Islamist party? To answer these questions, we explore the ideological reforms, policy reforms, and tactical reforms of JIH from the 1940s until today.

Part I: Mawdudi and the Pre-Partition Jamaat-e-Islaami
A clear account of Mawdudi's personal ideology and the creation of Jamaat-e-Islaami in 1941 is critical to understanding how the organization developed into the premier Islamist parties in India and Pakistan. The pre-Partition JeI not only provides us with a foundation for understanding Mawdudi's ultimate wish for the Subcontinent, but it also allows for a contrast between Mawdudi's idealism and the realities of JIH's successes and failures in the past six decades. And moreover, we examine how the eventual realities in India diverge from this pre-Partition idealism.
Mawdudi's approach to Islam was non-traditionalist and greatly a reaction to the “western storm” (Ahmad 50). The resulting ideology was characterized by the existence of two polar opposites – Islam and jaahaliyat. For Mawdudi, jaahaliyat meant everything but the ideology upon which the JeI existed. Participation in secular legislature, secular judiciary, or any advancement of the secular was considered “un-Islamic” (Ahmad 3) The JeI itself propagated the idealist vision of establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout South Asia. This philosophy, hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah (Allah's Reign) was clearly outlined in JeI's first Constitution (Dastuur): sovereignty over this world belonged solely to Allah (Ali). And moreover, it was the duty of the members of JeI to convert the Subcontinent from the “land of unbelief” to the “land of Islam”1 (Ahmad 3). In addition, membership of the original Jamaat was exclusive, a test of ones piety and convergence to Mawdudi's strict philosophies. For example, Mawdudi's refusal to work within any secular framework was not the prevailing stance within the Muslim community (Ahmad 8). Thus, though the essential creed of the Jamaat was as simple as the kalima2 – JeI catered to a particular niche of purists in its pre-Partition history (Ali).
JeI's intolerance for secularism meant that it conflicted directly with Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League. Rooted in Muslim nationalism, the Muslim League sought the creation of a separate homeland for the Subcontinent's Muslims. Mawdudi saw Western-educated Jinnah's nationalist rhetoric as a threat to his vision of hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah. A nationalist state would not be an Islamic state (Moten 179). Furthermore, Mawdudi's propagation of the “Two State Theory” was a consequence of his beliefs that otherwise, Indian Muslims would be “annihilated and absorbed” into the Hindu majority (Moten 179). Therefore, the only option, in Mawdudi's opinion, was to advocate for “the Muslim community to turn inward” and to revive the notion of dar-ul-Islam (Moten 180). This desire for revivalism served as the Jamaat's raison d'etre from its creation in 1941 until the foundation of independent India and a separate Pakistan in 1947.

Part II: Ideological Reform: From Hukuumat-e-Ilaahiyah to Iqaamat-e-Deen
In 1947, the bloody partitioning of the Subcontinent drew arbitrary lines through India's northwestern and northeastern regions. This led to the establishment of the modern-day Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In relation to the JeI, the emergence of these two new nations meant a shift in how it could approach its ultimate goal of hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah across South Asia.
In India, the re-organized Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind acknowledged that Mawdudi's original desire to instate an Islamic caliphate across the Subcontinent would be neither achievable, nor practical. Rather, JIH opted for a different Quranic term to describe their goal – iqaamat-e-deen (Ali). JIH's current constitution struggles to provide a confident definition of what this objective entails.
It is very difficult to give an English equivalent of the term 'Iqaamat-e-Deen.' It may, however, be rendered as the 'Establishment, Realization or Pursuit of Religion.' ‘Religion,’ ‘Way of Life,’ or 'System of Belief and Action’ are, however, very imperfect renderings of the word ‘Deen.’ (“The Constitution”)
In spite of the vague nature of the term, one can rationalize JIH's decision to opt for less absolute rhetoric. The Muslim constituency of post-Partition India had been reduced to less than twelve percent of the entire population. And moreover, the community of Muslims still remaining in the nation were widely decentralized. Therefore, a reduction in rhetoric would allow for JIH to enter the policy space in a majority Hindu nation – as pragmatists. However, Irfan Ahmed argues that “the replacement was more terminological than substantive-ideological” (Ahmad 284). And until the 1980s, JIH still believed that through a series of conversions and tactical political maneuvering. an eventual Islamic state would be possible in India (Anand). However, this rhetorical shift away from hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah toward iqaamat-e-deen further extended to JIH allowing its members to participate in Indian general elections in the 1980s. And in April 2011, JIH established its own party, the Welfare Party of India. This party brought together JIH elites and the greater Muslim community, and surprisingly, many Hindus and a Christian priest serve as the Party's office-holders (Anand).

Part III. Policy Reforms under Iqaamat-e-Deen
The decision to shift rhetoric from that of establishing an all-encompassing Islamic caliphate to establishment of increased Islamic consciousness within the existing political institutions has provided the Jamaat in India with many opportunities and successes.
Mawdudi stated that there was “at least sixty percent chance of success” in establishing an Islamic state in India (Ahmad 79). But soon after Independence, JIH realized that the secular state – as well as many Indian Muslims – were turning a blind eye toward the Jamaat. Therefore, JIH had to reconsider its ideology or risk being irrelevant in the Indian policy space. The first of such strategic compromises was the shift to iqaamat-e-deen as the notion of India under Allah's Reign was ridiculed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Anand).
Secondly, the Jamaat transitioned from being an institution catering to the strict isolationist principles of Mawdudiyat to one encouraging participation from the masses. This participation came mostly in the form of the electoral and political process. As India underwent its first two general elections in 1952 and 1957, JIH endorsed its members and all Muslims to boycott the polls. In accordance with Mawdudiyat, JIH saw participation in electoral politics as submission to the Indian taghuti nizaam3. However, most Muslims were indifferent to the Jamaat's ideocrats and entered the democratic system as either voters or candidates. These failures in garnering respect from the masses forced JIH to question its restriction of secular civic activity (Anand).
In 1961, JIH's shura deemed that “if the path of elections could be used for the goal of iqaamat-e-din,” partaking in the taghuti nizaam would be admissible. Thus, elections were redefined in JIH policy as a means through which pragmatic Muslims could facilitate the rise of Islam in India. This build-up in policy found its climax in the 1962 general elections. On the eve of the elections, JIH circulated a pamphlet summoning Muslims to participate in the elections. The policy of JIH seems to have taken a complete turn as JIH leadership now portrayed a lack of civil engagement by Indian Muslims as “tantamount to suicide” (Anand).
Furthermore, by the mid-1980s, JIH began allowing its membership to participate in Indian elections – as long as the candidates of their choice were not “clearly against Islam and Muslims” (Anand). In essence, the political organization which had begun as a barrier to the growth of secularism in India had decided to manipulate secular government to meet its own ends. In the face of growing Hindutva rhetoric in the 1980s, JIH further emphasized the importance of secularism in India (Anand). At this point in time, many of the institutionalized phrases Mawdudi had evoked to describe the mission of the Jamaat in South Asia were also being reconsidered. An interview with one Jamaat member expresses the “culture shock” and insecurity some felt about the JIH's evolution:
“How on earth could Islam allow voting for taghut (idolatrous parliamentary system)? When I joined the Jamaat, we were told to eliminate taghut, secularism, democracy... everything against the Quran... We joined for iqaamat-e-din. Now the Jamaat is fighting for iqaamat-e-secular democracy. Do you know about the Forum for Democracy and Communal Harmony?... What is it doing? It is fighting for the glory of secularism and democracy. You have also read Maududi. Tell me what has secularism got to do with Islam? Where is the original ideology?” (Ahmad 213)
This “original ideology” that traditional JIH members nostalgically reflected upon was further lost as JIH even dropped the phrase iqaamat-e-deen from the covers of its publications (Anand). The Jamaat in India was facing difficulty as it negotiated its identity. It was too late to backtrack to the days of Mawdudiyat dominating JIH agenda. And from the early 1990s, Hindu nationalist politics was gaining popularity. The Jamaat needed to reach out to Indian Muslims to create a stronger political presence (Khan).

Part IV. Tactical Reforms: Organizational Successes of JIH
Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind's pragmatism and willingness to engage the existing Indian political institutions has afforded it the opportunity to position sectors of its supporters in specialized organizations – all working within JIH's framework to oversee and advocate for change. An examination of JIH's issued resolutions shows that the diversity of the fields in which JIH sees itself as a potent influence ranges as widely as the Occupy Wall Street Movement to Palestine to US sanctions again Iran to the threat of a Naxalite takeover of the Indian Republic (“Resolutions”). However, the most important of JIH's associations are domestic and internal to the Muslim community. JIH presence in organizations such as the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat ensure that the JIH remains relevant and accessible within Muslim circles (Ahmad 177, 125).
One of the most divisive issues of Indian politics in the 1990s was the Babri Masjid controversy. This issue elevated radical Hindu and Muslim rhetoric in the nation, though one can argue that the issue was one of politicians manipulating the people's sentiment. Hindus believed that the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya sat on top of the location of the birthplace of Rama – a prominent Hindu deity. And Hindutva political rhetoric was shepherding many Hindus into joining a campaign to physically demolish this mosque. In regard to this issue, the Mushawarat created the Babri Masjid Movement Coalition Committee. This Committee, headed by two senior Jamaat leaders, best symbolizes JIH's transition from Islamic rhetoric to rhetoric of secularism and equality. Unlike other Islamic groups also focusing on the issue, JIH at the Committee urged Muslims to seek “peaceful, democratic, and constitutional means” to ensure that justice is preserved and the mosque is not endangered (Ahmad 211).
Although the Ayodhya dispute concluded with the victory of the Hindutva movement and the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the events made a few points painstakingly clear to JIH. Firstly, JIH could not compete on the national stage in a nation with a 85% Hindu majority with a strictly Islamicly appealing platform. JIH could not propagate an identity based clearly on iqaamat-e-deen, let alone hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah. JIH had to appeal to greater values held by Indians across religious, regional, and socioeconomic barriers (Anand). Secondly, the Jamaat could not develop the militant face that many of its contemporaries were developing. Militantism would only alienate JIH from the majority of Muslims and from those Hindus who also felt that the Ayodhya dispute had pasted a fascist face on the Indian Republic (Ahmad 211). Thus, JIH turned towards nationalism and the secular democracy to justify its role in the Indian policy space – a move unthinkable to Mawdudi (Ahmad 213).
This shift toward emphasizing themes of equality, justice, secularism, and nationalism permitted JIH to expand its mission from creating a strictly Islamic society to striving for a society organized around community for all sub-groups. This community-building initiative came in the form of the Forum for Democracy and Communal Amity (FDCA) as well as wings of the JIH which concentrated on issues of specific constituencies (Ahmad 221). Two important wings have been the Girls Islamic Organization (GIO) and the Student Islamic Organization of India (SIO). Other than their basic mission of spreading dawah, these organizations serve as whistle-blowers when they feel that the government is overstepping its rights in the lives of minorities, especially Muslims. One such example in which both the GIO and SIO cooperated in protest was at a college in the southern state of Karnataka. The college had instated a ban against the burqa on its campus and the GIO and SIO had allied with secular student unions on campus to advocate for its repeal (“SIO, GIO”).
This type of activism from JIH and its wings symbolizes the organization's efforts to evolve parallel to the ideology and practical quotidian concerns of its constituency. In its evolution from aiding Hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah to acting as the defender of secular democracy in India, JIH has sought to broaden its appeal in a nation presenting obvious obstacles to any Islamist organization.

Part V. Reactions from the Indian State
As Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind developed from a radical fringe movement of just a few hundred members to a flagship organization attempting to represent the multi-faceted nature of Indian Sunni Muslims, one then naturally wonders how the Indian state responded to this growth in influence and presence of the JIH. In India, JIH was little threat to much larger forces of nationalism; however, JIH itself has evolved to embody these fundamental themes of secularism, democracy, and popular welfare – albeit from a different background. Therefore, as the share of the policy space sought by JIH increasingly overlaps with the those of mainstream parties, the Indian state acts to curb the influence of any Islamicly-linked organization (Abedin).
In analyzing “state reactions” the JIH, it is difficult to assume what constitutes “the state” as India is a fluid democracy with any number of viewpoints characterizing its different branches and its different levels of politics. That said, a relationship of tension between the state and the JIH is especially emphasized during periods of Islamophobia throughout the country or any political instability in the government itself. The Indian state has thus banned JIH twice in its history. The first proscription of JIH occurred from 1975-1977 when Indira Gandhi banned many organizations, including the influential Hindutva RSS and the JIH. The second proscription occurred after the demolition of the Babri Masjid affair when the RSS was banned once again. In regards to the government's decision to ban JIH, Mahtab Alam describes the “Politics of the Ban.” By this, Alam believes that the Indian government is not necessarily forced to ban JIH because of JIH's actions or ideologies. Rather, the proscription of JIH is another unfortunate consequence of Islam as a minority ideology in India (Alam). In these two situations, the government was primarily concerned about the dangerous, threatening actions of the RSS. However, the government felt pressure to ban JIH alongside RSS in order to show impartiality in Hindu-Muslim strife (Abedin). Moreover, these occurrences also demonstrate a conflict within branches of the Indian government as the banning of JIH was later overturned by the judiciary in Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind vs Union of India (“Jamaat-e-Islami Hind”). Both institutions are striving toward different ends – the executive seeks political stability; the judiciary seeks legal consistency.

Conclusion
The journey of Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind from its beginnings in the 1940s and 1950s to its existence today is a product of three stages of reformation: ideological reform, policy reform, and tactical reform. Through these means, the Jamaat has become the symbolic player in the movement of political Islam in India. More interestingly, JIH has managed to become relevant in an environment in which it lacks a magnitude of resources and only a small percentage of the greater population is Muslim. Therefore, JIH has managed to broaden its appeal by compromising on the ideals of Mawdudiyat and embracing the flexibility of the institutions available. This decision comes with its advantages and disadvantages. Traditionalists – such as SIMI4 – lose confidence in the Jamaat and resort to other more extremist Islamist groups (Khan). On the other hand, the Jamaat presents pragmatists – such as GIO and SIO members – with opportunities to engage the system and enact the change they desire. JIH evidently sees the benefits of democratic engagement to be greater than its drawbacks. The organization has launched a political party based on human welfare and secularism and it has designed the “Vision 2016” program to provide access to crucial necessities to India's poor minorities, such as Muslims (“JI Hind”). With a viable future ahead of it, JIH sees itself at the crossroads of many different political identities. It will be fascinating to see whether JIH and its subsidiaries will brand themselves as Islamist, Populist, Communist, or some unique combination of the many choices it has experimented with over the course of its existence. Regardless, the pragmatic approach which JIH embodies will cushion its future. All its eggs are not in a single basket, and Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind is never afraid to redefine its orientation.

1From Dar-ul-Kufr to Dar-ul-Islam
2La illah ila allah wa muhammad rasuul allah – “There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God”
3Idolatrous system – in Mawdudiyat, loyalty to any “un-Islamic” institution, such as the secular state, judiciary, government institutions, etc
4Former student wing of JIH which was replaced by SIO after SIMI turned to militantism

Saturday, August 20, 2011

Freedom Park, Bangalore

This is a slideshow of photos documenting the afternoon I spent at Freedom Park in Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore. This ongoing rally is one of many taking place around India and abroad in accordance with the India Again Corruption movement -- with its neo-Gandhian figurehead, Anna Hazare. These photos are from Friday, August 19th.

The music is the official anthem of the movement and was playing on loud speakers at the Park. 

Friday, July 8, 2011

"Nothing's going to be solved here..."

In my opinion, there are two Indias: the “modern India” that is publicized in the West and the “establishment India” that actually runs the nation. One generates money for the nation, and the other swallows money from the nation. People would like to believe that they live in the former, when in all actuality, they live in the latter. The privileged want to stay far from this “establishment,” while the average Indian drowns in the madness.


In my past trips to India, I somewhat naively stayed inside the high, protective walls of the glamourous five-story shopping malls and the trendy over-priced coffee shops. It's important for people unfamiliar with India to realize that these glitzy, posh locations certainly exist. India cannot all be characterized by Slumdog Millionaire, but nor can it be summarized as being a Bollywood fantasyland of song and dance. India most certainly is not that either.

However, this trip to India is consisting of more diverse, mundane experiences – experiences which were not of luxury, but of necessity or function. These experiences are in a way democratizing. Malls and department stores are only for the rich; the poor do not dare approach them. However, paying the telephone or gas bill requires people from all walks of life to congregate at one building.

These buildings are often old, rotting buildings which are run with no concern for maintenance or proper (or even minimal) upkeep. My encounter with the ugliness of the Indian public sector came in the form of a routine trip to the telecommunications company BSNL (Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited) to enquire about a broadband connection at home.
My complaints about this establishment will easily turn into a rant, so I will list some of my grievances here in bullet form:

  • The building was DIRTY...as in, I am yet to see a dirtier building in India that is still standing for a legitimate purpose.
  • Information is so decentralized that it takes around half a dozen people to answer one question. You are constantly pointed from person to person.
  • In addition to the inefficiency, the disorganization is unbelievable. India honestly surprises me; seeing all this, one is startled that the nation is even running. There were files everywhere: sitting in piles on every desk and in thousands (maybe millions) in storage rooms.
  • The definition of bureaucracy in India: people given offices to do absolutely nothing but keep pushing the work (and the customers) onto other people.

Finally, I can't always help but notice the connections between religiosity and inaction in India. I feel like people are so overwhelmed themselves with what is happening around them that they almost subconsciously give up, recognize their incapacity against the system, and paste god pictures and posters on the wall. One of the rooms we were pointed to was a two-person office with every single inch of wall space covered with two to three dozen different deities. Had it not been a bureaucratic office, the room was quite aesthetically pleasing, if nothing else. My reaction when I walked into this room: “ *SIGH* Nothing's going to be solved here...”

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

West Beyrouth (بيروت الغربية)‎ Film Review



Ziad Doueiri's 1998 film, West Beyrouth, seeks to understand the zeitgeist of the 1975 Lebanese Civil War. The director approaches this goal through the examination of a group of adolescents and their interactions, adventures, and concerns. Beirut is divided into Muslim and Christian districts, Al-Gharbiah (The West) and Al-Sharqiah (The East), respectively. Nonetheless, young adults such as the main protagonist, Tarek, continue to hate attending school, forming their first crushes, and arguing with their parents. In this sense, West Beirut attempts to chronicle ordinary life in Beirut in a time of uncertainty. The nature of Beirut is changing, but so is the nature of its people – especially the youth.

In his film, Doueiri largely deals with social concerns and shifts in the Beirut of the mid-1970s, rather than the political or military happenings. Therefore, the audience gains a grasp on a certain lifestyle of the people. For example, the entrenchment of the French system (especially in education) calls upon colonialist themes and notions of the East that had remained unchanged in European perspective for millennia. This attitude is represented in the first scene as Tarek is reprimanded for standing for nationalism over the French. As the film continues, the audience also learns of Tarek's distaste for French literature as well as Arabs; he proudly claims Phoenician origins. Moreover, Tarek serves as a bridge between the Muslim and Christian peoples of Beirut. His friends are a Muslim boy, Omar, and a Christian girl, May. Therefore, Tarek symbolizes a new generation of Lebanese – one concerned over the entity of nation, rather than faith. He represents a strand of hope for Lebanon's unity and future.

As the film highlights a contentious era in history, the film today is likely to evoke different feelings from different areas of the world. Both Americans and Lebanese are likely to view the era portrayed in West Beyrouth as foreshadowing the current situation in the country. Moreover, the film might surface a feeling of helplessness that the 1975 conflict presented in the film still continues today – religious factions are not at peace, internal politics has yet to mature, and Beirut is still threatened by the actions of bordering powers such as Syria and Israel. Similarly, Americans might place the film into their own narrative pertaining to Arabs and the Middle East. They might view the conflict in the film through the perspective of 9/11 and two wars. Contrarily, the social and light-hearted aspect of much of the film encourages the audience to appreciate certain nuances in shared humanity. And it is these nuances of love, compassion, and community in Doueiri's story that manage to dominate lesser themes.


Finally, what is the image of the greater Middle East and the Arab population that the audience will take with it when leaving the cinema? They will notice the amount of fluidity between the cultures of the West and Lebanon. The ubiquity of Western brand names, music, and pop culture references is clear. Audiences will notice the permeable nature of English words such as “Ok” – and knowledge of French literature, history, and language. Audiences will notice traits of 1970s Lebanon similar to 1970s United States or Europe: the pre-occupation with hedonism, sex, and smoking. Moreover, audiences will notice the spectrum of ideologies and lifestyles present in Lebanon. The film reaches the level of the common Lebanese street, past the heightened, contentious politics most viewers experience through the news. Viewers see Tarek's family that is liberal and forward-looking. But they also hear Omar's narration of his father's shift to a stricter adherence to Islam – forbidding music and television, requesting that his wife adopt the hijab. The audience realizes these ideological debates and dichotomies similar to ones ongoing in their own society. And through this exposure to an Arab film that is based on social realities and relationships, rather than politics, audiences imbibe the humanity that exists in the Middle East – bringing people closer together and wiser in their judgement.

Sunday, April 24, 2011

Ram Ke Naam: A Critical Look at the Ayodhya Dispute


Anand Patwardhan's 1992 documentary Ram Ke Naam (In the Name of God) chronicles the tumultuous scene leading up to the eventual tragic destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya. People are killed around India, religious sentiments are hurt – but Indian right-wing politics benefits. In the documentary, Patwardhan follows former Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) president L. K. Advani on his “Rath Yatra” – a right-wing campaign to mobilize Hindu unity for the creation of a Ram Mandir where the Masjid stood. The campaign and its consequential destruction of the Babri Masjid resulted in communal Hindu-Muslim violence across the nation, perhaps violence unmatched since the Partition era. Moreover, the perspective of the film depicts how a potentially small issue was exploited by right-wing political entities to enact a movement nationwide – a shift in primary identity for many people from being “Indian” to “Hindu” or even “BJP.” In that sense, Ram ke Naam manifests the debilitating, dangerous fire that spreads when ideology is preferred over practical understanding and tolerance.

As one watches the series of events that unfold in Patwardhan's narrative, many small points prove to become integral in the development of the rhetoric expressed by the Hindu right-wing. For example, Pujari Lal Das of the Ramjanmabhoomi Temple mentions the striking “political game” played by conservatives in which the right takes advantage of small subtleties to “cash in on Hindu votes.” Furthermore, Pujari Lal Das emphasizes how the Vishwa Hindu Parishad's (VHP) support of the Temple is purely exploitive of political sentiments, with no true passion for the Temple establishment and its spiritual significance. He notes that the VHP does not pray at the Ramjanmabhoomi Temple, nor does the organization make donations. As Lal Das vehemently states, the politicians do not mind the killings, but only mind money and seats in Parliament.

Another interesting point in the social tensions is Patwardhan's portrayal of the lower castes along the path of the “Rath Yatra.” They find themselves lost amongst the crowd of hot-headed ideologists; they realize only the daily concerns of the people. Given Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, these poverty-stricken people whose physiological needs are not met do not deal with ideological extremism. Often, the most rational and liberal views come from people of this socio-economic group. For example, a homeless woman holds her baby and watches Advani pass through. She demands: “What do they do for the poor? We live on the pavements...!” Similarly, another group of men also complain of the misplaced priorities of the Indian right-wing; politicians' ideological issues defeat the people's practical concerns. They suggest that both a Mandir and the Masjid should stand in Ayodhya – and that this conflict itself causes economic problems for ordinary people. In essence, this theme shows how the Babri Masjid conflict was largely a result of political exploitation by a select few right-wing Hindus. The conflict was not born and bred by the people, but rather born and bred at the top to be disseminated as political propaganda to the greater populace.

The viewing of this film comes at a critical point in the course as one examines Hinduism's reform into today's modern, consolidated spiritual and political power. Figures such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Swami Vivekananda are applauded for introducing Hinduism to the world as tolerant and progressive, but what has happened to their vision today? Is this is the same perspective of Hinduism that one will perceive through today's news headlines? At the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago, Vivekananda introduced the West to a reformed Hinduism with this impression: “We believe not only in universal toleration but we accept all religions as true. However, only two decades ago, we hear chants from the right-wing: “Maarenge maraaenge mandir wahiin banaaenge!” and “Jo swapna dekhte Baabar ke / Armaan miTaa-kar maanenge!” – and this rhetoric of hatred and intolerance has only augmented in recent years. Therefore, a study of Hinduism's key figures follows the same portrayal of idealism in Hindu society such as that idealism shown in the Ramayana. Ideally, Hinduism is tolerant; however, in reality, Hinduism is susceptible to the same pressures of politics and extremism just as many of the world's other faiths.

Anand Patwardhan's Ram Ke Naam documents a formative event in the development of how India's Hindu and Muslim populations understand religion, politics, and the distinction between the two in their country. The event reveals to Muslims their own helplessness when the government falls into the hands of the Hindu right-wing, mobilized by ideology and united by identity. The same event reveals to Hindus their own responsibility as the nation's vast majority to employ democracy to present India in a manner respecting tolerance, pluralism, secularism, and the 'bhaai-bhaai' mentality. In this sense, both Hindus and Muslims have a common goal as Indians – to uphold the dreams of Gandhi and Nehru, in creating an environment fulfilling Vivekananda's presentation of India's legacy of acceptance throughout history. 

Watch 'Ram Ke Naam' starting with Part 1

Thursday, December 23, 2010

Khuda Kay Liye and New York: One Tragedy, Two Stories




American audiences have seen the disaster of the September 11, 2001 attacks memorialized on film through features such as World Trade Center and United 93. However, Hollywood is not the only industry to document the troubles faced by people in the aftermath of the tragedy. Two films from across the world have also intrigued their audiences, but from perspectives, and for purposes significantly different from America's. Pakistan's 2007 film Khuda Kay Liye (In the Name of God) by Shoaib Mansoor and India's 2009 film New York by Kabir Khan offer a glimpse into two nations that – though distant from the attacks themselves – have experienced their backlash. These two films share much in common, but also differ immensely as they appeal to different domestic audiences, each with a different message to send to the world. Pakistan, as an Islamic republic, faces the struggle of self-identity as it hopes to communicate the aspirations of moderate Muslims. And India, a pluralistic democracy, reaches out to its diverse diaspora population in the United States and the post-9/11 trials which they face. Thus, the Pakistani film Khuda Kay Liye and the Indian film New York – though both set against the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks – emphasize significantly different messages traceable to the unique demographics, film traditions, and political climates native to each nation.

Khuda Kay Liye and New York, though based on similar themes of Islamophobia and the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, are two separate products of very different populations. Pakistani demographics show a nation that is almost exclusively Muslim, and the plot of Khuda Kay Liye reflects this. One conflict in the film is the foil between the main character, Mansoor, and his brother, Sarmad. Brought up in a secular household, the brothers participate in a rock music band, a type of music that often is criticized by more extremist Muslims (Khuda Kay Liye). But Sarmad falls prey to the extremists, grows a beard, relinquishes music and photography, and even requests that his mother and grandmother adopt the hijab. Disapproving of his brother, Mansoor continues his life, relocates to Chicago to study music, and lives a typical Western lifestyle. This parallelism serves to illustrate the nature of pressures from both extremes found in Pakistani society, thus leading to a crisis over self-identity in the minds of many young Pakistanis. When straddled between two very powerful institutions as Western culture and Islam, a safe middle is boggling to retain. Husham Ahmed describes the threatening and potent nature of this crisis in his article in The Statesmen:

Pakistan’s turbulent history has widened, rather than resolved, the contradictions present in our society, leaving society as polarised as ever. The young generation is still searching for the answers that previous generations of Pakistanis have failed to provide. While groping for solutions in this dark period, the youth are exploited by certain individuals who with their oratory skills present a simplistic answer to complicated dilemmas by urging them to focus on a common external enemy. They spit venom, blabber about conspiracy theories, and preach jingoism in the media. (Ahmed)

Therefore, the Pakistani film is dealt a very heavy burden, the burden of dispelling notions that all Pakistanis or all Muslims constitute a large anti-Western force. The film must depict advocates of liberal Islam contrary to the practice of fundamentalism, and thus this conflict forms a major element of the film's plot, while the film's Indian counterpart, New York, is presented, a different, if not lighter, burden of proof.

Just as Khuda Kay Liye is a product of the Muslim identity of Pakistan, the Indian film industry's production New York appeals to a majority Hindu nation with a prevalent and affluent diaspora community. Therefore, at the film's inception, as the camera cruises over the city of New York, the director indicates that this is a story of South Asians in the United States (New York). As protagonist Omar arrives as an international student to New York and forms close friendships with suave American-born Indians Samir and Maya, it is evident that the intended audience and goals of this film are quite different from those of the more conservative and modest Khuda Kay Liye. For example, conversational registers of Hindi are intertwined with English; characters converse just as the children of Indian immigrants would. Yet in Khuda Kay Liye, the nature of the content and circumstances necessitate a higher, ornate register of Urdu.

Similarly, the cultural values depicted in New York are more secular and less focused on religion, but on greater personal morals. Film critic Omar Qureshi comments on this aspect of New York and the universal themes it propagates: “Films with which people can identify always work. Everyone can connect with films that revolve around friendships because everyone has a friend. There is no one who doesn't have a single friend” (“Bollywood”). Therefore, the Indian film is manufactured to appeal to pluralistic domestic and international Indian societies consisting of a plethora of languages, ethnicities, and religions. As Saltz writes in her New York Times review of the film, New York “hinges on loyalty, love and friendship, a holy trinity of Hindi cinema” (Saltz). Where Khuda Kay Liye is able to call upon its audience's shared experiences as Muslims, the makers of New York must expand their film's appeal to a much broader set of people. And this too constitutes a burden resting on the shoulders of the film's producers. And especially in a nation where the formulaic, romantic epic genre has reigned for decades, complete with escapist song-and-dance sequences, vengeful villains, and macho heroes – appealing to the masses with a serious film on terrorism, politics, and discrimination is a difficult argument to win.

Many of the vast differences between the Pakistani and Indian narrations of the attack's aftermath stem from the film traditions ingrained in the countries' histories. The two neighbors share a combined tradition of filmmaking which was interrupted as the region experienced a violent post-colonial partition in the late 1940s. During this period, much of the talent remained in the new Indian state, giving birth to a strong tradition of film based in then Bombay. Consequently, the Pakistani industry based in Lahore experienced a devastating brain drain (Zafar). But how does this history cement the fates of Khuda Kay Liye and New York? How does this history serve to further distinguish the features of these two films?

First, until recently, the screening of Indian films in Pakistan was illegal. Likewise, Khuda Kay Liye was the first Pakistani film to screen in Indian cinemas in 43 years. Therefore, the film is also burdened with exposing Pakistan to Indians and international audiences who have probably only seen the country through news reports detailing burgeoning elements of fundamentalism. Khuda Kay Liye's director Shoaib Mansoor remarks that he was “shocked by the ignorance” of Indians regarding life in Pakistan:

Indian films never stopped coming to Pakistan, on DVDs, so every Pakistani is absolutely clear about the way of life in India, about how everything works in India. But there is nothing coming in the other direction, with the result that India has very clear misconceptions about Pakistan. They had very surprising ideas about Pakistan. They asked: ‘Do you have taxis there?’ ‘Can women drive?’ ‘Are women allowed to go to university?’ They thought Pakistan consisted entirely of fanatics and mullahs. (Gentleman)

This “two-way mirror” effect between the neighboring countries has resulted in dangerous stereotypes of Pakistan, and Mansoor's efforts to exhibit the identity crisis Pakistan is suffering works to placate these notions. As popular Indian script writer and lyricist Javed Akhtar comments, “ Ignorance breeds suspicion and suspicion breeds hate; it creates huge villains. There is a lot to be heard and seen by Indian and by U.S. audiences here [in Khuda Kay Liye]” (Iqbal). But if Pakistan's Khuda Kay Liye possesses soul and an honest goal of changing world opinion, what it lacks, according to Indian critic Subhash Jha, is that “it is not a pot-boiler; it doesn’t have the audience-pulling big stars” (Gentleman). However, this commercial appeal is exactly what New York can claim.

The Indian film tradition originates from escapist sagas of romance and sentimental family dramas, and the grim topics explored in New York diverge from this traditional path to box-office success. But the producers of New York have not completely abandoned this tested and well-worn formula. The attractive, fair-skinned superstars, the catchy songs, the glamorous fashions and locations are all found in Kabir Khan's film. Glenn Whipp of the Los Angeles Times locates these elements of the Indian film tradition in that the characters as students at a fictitious New York college “have no cares (and apparently no classes).” Furthermore, “musical montages repeatedly emphasize youthful passion and Omar's unrequited love for Maya” (Whipp). These facets of a traditional Indian film as demonstrated in New York, unlike Khuda Kay Liye, demonstrate how the makers of New York are forced to maintain a level of commercial elements among a background of more gripping, realistic elements such as terrorism, politics, and anti- Muslim discrimination. Thus, one may interpret this expectation of gloss and glamour as well as a coherent, well-researched chronicle of the September 11 aftermath as another burden for New York.

Not only are Khuda Kay Liye and New York products of their respective intended audiences and countries' film traditions, but the manner of each film's storytelling is also attributed to the political climate in each nation. First, any discussion of Pakistani politics entails Pakistani military engagements on two separate fronts: the Afghani border in the West and Kashmir in the East. Regarding the conflict in the West, Khuda Kay Liye documents Sarmad's fall into the hands of fundamentalism and his departure from the liberalism of Lahore to the tribal regions to participate in jihad. During this period, Sarmad is trapped by the blinding influence of Maulana Tahiri. As Makarand Paranjape notices in his book Altered Destinations, “the bad mullah [Maulana Tahiri] has a distinctly Pashto or Afghani accent.” This subtle, but meaningful use of language serves to underline the contempt that liberal Pakistanis hold against what they view as extremist influences from Afghanistan sweeping their cities and towns. A public policy think tank, the New America Foundation confirms this view. In a 2009 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Steve Coll presented that “ Pakistan's struggle to achieve its constitutional and founding ideals of democracy, pluralism, and a culture rooted in a modernizing Islam have been impeded in part by the spillover effects of continual warfare in Afghanistan” (Cole). This animosity between liberal, urban Pakistanis and the lawlessness of the tribal regions intensifies when one also takes into consideration US violations of Pakistani sovereignty with drone attacks on Pakistani territory and subsequent deaths (Brulliard and Hussain).

But this more recent conflict has done nothing to subdue the long-standing rivalry between Pakistan and India, also a conflict subtly addressed in Khuda Kay Liye. Once Mansoor reaches the United States, he quickly adapts to Western life, but the attacks in New York shake up Mansoor's progressing American dream. He is discriminated against, called a “terrorist” due to his Muslim identity, and faces brutal Guantanamo-style detention by the Americans. Paranjape interprets this course in the film as an exercise in finger-pointing at the Indians for their role in the marginalization of Muslims worldwide. Paranjape continues in Altered Destinations: “the man who betrays him [Mansoor] is a Sikh, an Indian who, when he is drunk, gets into a brawl and calls him a terrorist because the Sikh's own family members have been killed by Islamic terrorists back in India” (Paranjape). This statement not only makes claims toward the nature of Pakistani-Indian relations from a regional perspective, but also points to the political climate of domestic Muslim-Hindu relations in the Indian community.

The question of coexistence of India's diverse religious communities is one addressed, by necessity rather than by choice, in the film New York. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Samir, Omar, and Maya transform from being average college students to representatives of a people deemed anti-American, regressive, and violent. Eventually, Samir is detained in Guantanamo-like circumstances by American intelligence claiming that Samir participates in a terror cell located in New York. Vijay Nair criticizes this aspect of Indian filmmaking in his article in The Hindu when he reprimands Indian films for acquiescing to the sensitive and controversial nature of politics – thus resorting to stereotypes. Nair urges that:

None of these films try to reflect on the phenomenon of terrorism intelligently. Mainstream directors are likely to balk at the idea of terrorism being spawned by truths closer at home [in India]. It is only by design and not accident that a New York...unfolds in the American context. The two feuding parties, the white American population, as well as the Islamic terrorists, can be perceived as adversaries by the Indian audience (Nair).

Nair's analysis of New York's placement of stereotypes for both political as well as commercial reasons, points to the atmosphere of Indian-Pakistani and larger Hindu-Muslim relations in the Subcontinent. Just as in Khuda Kay Liye, Pakistan points its finger at Afghanistan as the source of fundamentalist activity, in New York, India directs its criticism to its alienated, ghettoed Muslim minority and at Pakistan. Neither nation is willing to accept its role in the growth of fundamentalism within its borders. India will not affirm the effects of Muslim marginalization in a largely Hindu society, while Pakistan will not affirm its inability to govern the lawless tribal provinces. Thus, both nations' politicians, and both nations' films, find scapegoats in the United States and in each other.

Khuda Kay Liye and New York are two films about one world-changing event told from two profoundly different perspectives. The mixture of the spice and sultry heat of South Asia blend with explosive topics such as prejudice, politics, and identity to form two films incapable of transcending the cynical nature of their homelands. Khuda Kay Liye offers to the world a glimpse into Pakistan's struggle over its modern identity, the strides of its meager film industry, and the lack of pragmatism in its corrupt politics. Meanwhile, two years later, New York exports another glossy drama to its Indian audiences detailing how despite addressing a serious topic, Indian film cannot detach itself from glamour and resorting to stereotypes in order to narrate a story. However, given difficult circumstances in the Subcontinent, both films also suffer from heavy burdens which restrict the filmmakers and their intentions. Khuda Kay Liye must communicate a message to its Muslim audiences that they have a choice between two paths: fundamentalism and liberalism. And with either choice, they cannot escape criticism. Similarly, New York is pressured to create a film experience that is grossly commercial, yet able to appeal to India's pluralistic society and its diverse overseas markets. Given these pressures, both films merit a strong level of praise for addressing their stories in a meaningful and poignant, if biased, style – something films before them, and many after, have failed to accomplish.