Introduction
The
beginnings of the Jamaat-e-Islaami and the roots of its pre-Partition
ideology can be traced directly to the ideology of Sayyid Abul Ala
Mawdudi. As one of the most prolific figures of the twentieth
century, Mawdudi was critical in the development of Islam as a potent
force in the era of post-British South Asia. Once
Independence was won and Partition took place, Mawdudi and his JeI
reorganized
in Lahore, Pakistan under the name JeI
Pakistan,
while the organization's Indian counterparts took the name JeI
Hind (Moten
180).
This paper seeks to examine the ultimate objectives and methods
administered by Jamaat-e-Islaami in India – Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind
(JIH). The Jamaat is established across South Asia in Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and Kashmir. However, India is the only minority-Muslim
nation in which it is present. How does JIH trace its evolution from
the days of hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah
and Mawdudiyat
in
the 1940s to its formation of a secular political party in 2011?
How has JIH negotiated its identity and legitimacy in order to own
policy space, especially in a secular nation in which Muslims are a
small minority. And how does the secular and largely Hindu-background
of the Indian state react to the nation's most prominent Islamist
party? To answer these questions, we explore the ideological reforms,
policy reforms, and tactical reforms of JIH from the 1940s until
today.
Part
I: Mawdudi and the Pre-Partition Jamaat-e-Islaami
A
clear account of Mawdudi's personal ideology and the creation of
Jamaat-e-Islaami in 1941 is critical to understanding how the
organization developed into the premier Islamist parties in India and
Pakistan. The pre-Partition JeI not only provides us with a
foundation for understanding Mawdudi's ultimate wish for the
Subcontinent, but it also allows for a contrast between Mawdudi's
idealism and the realities of JIH's successes and failures in the
past six decades. And moreover, we examine how the eventual realities
in India diverge from this pre-Partition idealism.
Mawdudi's
approach to Islam was non-traditionalist and greatly a reaction to
the “western storm” (Ahmad 50). The resulting ideology was
characterized by the existence of two polar opposites – Islam and
jaahaliyat.
For Mawdudi, jaahaliyat
meant
everything but the ideology upon which the JeI existed. Participation
in secular legislature, secular judiciary, or any advancement of the
secular was considered “un-Islamic” (Ahmad 3) The JeI itself
propagated the idealist vision of establishing an Islamic caliphate
throughout South Asia. This philosophy, hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah
(Allah's Reign) was clearly outlined in JeI's first Constitution
(Dastuur):
sovereignty over this world belonged solely to Allah (Ali). And
moreover, it was the duty of the members of JeI to convert the
Subcontinent from the “land of unbelief” to the “land of
Islam”1
(Ahmad 3). In addition, membership of the original Jamaat
was
exclusive, a test of ones piety and convergence to Mawdudi's strict
philosophies. For example, Mawdudi's refusal to work within any
secular framework was not the prevailing stance within the Muslim
community (Ahmad 8). Thus, though the essential creed of the Jamaat
was as simple as the kalima2
– JeI catered to a particular niche of purists in its pre-Partition
history (Ali).
JeI's
intolerance for secularism meant that it conflicted directly with
Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League. Rooted in Muslim nationalism,
the Muslim League sought the creation of a separate homeland for the
Subcontinent's Muslims. Mawdudi saw Western-educated Jinnah's
nationalist rhetoric as a threat to his vision of
hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah.
A
nationalist state would not be an Islamic state (Moten 179).
Furthermore, Mawdudi's propagation of the “Two State Theory” was
a consequence of his beliefs that otherwise, Indian Muslims would be
“annihilated and absorbed” into the Hindu majority (Moten 179).
Therefore, the only option, in Mawdudi's opinion, was to advocate for
“the Muslim community to turn inward” and to revive the notion of
dar-ul-Islam
(Moten
180). This desire for revivalism served as the Jamaat's raison d'etre
from its creation in 1941 until the foundation of independent India
and a separate Pakistan in 1947.
Part
II: Ideological Reform: From Hukuumat-e-Ilaahiyah to Iqaamat-e-Deen
In
1947, the bloody partitioning of the Subcontinent drew arbitrary
lines through India's northwestern and northeastern regions. This led
to the establishment of the modern-day Republic of India and the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In relation to the JeI, the emergence
of these two new nations meant a shift in how it could approach its
ultimate goal of hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah
across
South Asia.
In
India, the re-organized Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind acknowledged that
Mawdudi's original desire to instate an Islamic caliphate across the
Subcontinent would be neither achievable, nor practical. Rather, JIH
opted for a different Quranic term to describe their goal –
iqaamat-e-deen
(Ali).
JIH's current constitution struggles to provide a confident
definition of what this objective entails.
It is very difficult to give an English equivalent of the term 'Iqaamat-e-Deen.' It may, however, be rendered as the 'Establishment, Realization or Pursuit of Religion.' ‘Religion,’ ‘Way of Life,’ or 'System of Belief and Action’ are, however, very imperfect renderings of the word ‘Deen.’ (“The Constitution”)
In
spite of the vague nature of the term, one can rationalize JIH's
decision to opt for less absolute rhetoric. The Muslim constituency
of post-Partition India had been reduced to less than twelve percent
of the entire population. And moreover, the community of Muslims
still remaining in the nation were widely decentralized. Therefore, a
reduction in rhetoric would allow for JIH to enter the policy space
in a majority Hindu nation – as pragmatists. However, Irfan Ahmed
argues that “the replacement was more terminological than
substantive-ideological” (Ahmad 284). And until the 1980s, JIH
still believed that through a series of conversions and tactical
political maneuvering. an eventual Islamic state would be possible in
India (Anand). However, this rhetorical shift away from
hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah
toward
iqaamat-e-deen
further extended to JIH allowing its members to participate in Indian
general elections in the 1980s. And in April 2011, JIH established
its own party, the Welfare Party of India. This party brought
together JIH elites and the greater Muslim community, and
surprisingly, many Hindus and a Christian priest serve as the Party's
office-holders (Anand).
Part
III. Policy Reforms under Iqaamat-e-Deen
The decision to
shift rhetoric from that of establishing an all-encompassing Islamic
caliphate to establishment of increased Islamic consciousness within
the existing political institutions has provided the Jamaat in India
with many opportunities and successes.
Mawdudi
stated that there was “at least sixty percent chance of success”
in establishing an Islamic state in India (Ahmad 79). But soon after
Independence, JIH realized that the secular state – as well as many
Indian Muslims – were turning a blind eye toward the Jamaat.
Therefore, JIH had to reconsider its ideology or risk being
irrelevant in the Indian policy space. The first of such strategic
compromises was the shift to iqaamat-e-deen
as the notion of India under Allah's Reign was ridiculed by Muslims
and non-Muslims alike (Anand).
Secondly,
the Jamaat transitioned from being an institution catering to the
strict isolationist principles of Mawdudiyat
to
one encouraging participation from the masses. This participation
came mostly in the form of the electoral and political process. As
India underwent its first two general elections in 1952 and 1957, JIH
endorsed its members and all Muslims to boycott the polls. In
accordance with Mawdudiyat,
JIH saw participation in electoral politics as submission to the
Indian taghuti
nizaam3.
However,
most Muslims were indifferent to the Jamaat's ideocrats and entered
the democratic system as either voters or candidates. These failures
in garnering respect from the masses forced JIH to question its
restriction of secular civic activity (Anand).
In
1961, JIH's shura
deemed that “if the path of elections could be used for the goal of
iqaamat-e-din,”
partaking in the taghuti
nizaam
would be admissible. Thus, elections were redefined in JIH policy as
a means through which pragmatic Muslims could facilitate the rise of
Islam in India. This build-up in policy found its climax in the 1962
general elections. On the eve of the elections, JIH circulated a
pamphlet summoning Muslims to participate in the elections. The
policy of JIH seems to have taken a complete turn as JIH leadership
now portrayed a lack of civil engagement by Indian Muslims as
“tantamount to suicide” (Anand).
Furthermore, by the
mid-1980s, JIH began allowing its membership to participate in Indian
elections – as long as the candidates of their choice were not
“clearly against Islam and Muslims” (Anand). In essence, the
political organization which had begun as a barrier to the growth of
secularism in India had decided to manipulate secular government to
meet its own ends. In the face of growing Hindutva rhetoric in the
1980s, JIH further emphasized the importance of secularism in India
(Anand). At this point in time, many of the institutionalized phrases
Mawdudi had evoked to describe the mission of the Jamaat in South
Asia were also being reconsidered. An interview with one Jamaat
member expresses the “culture shock” and insecurity some felt
about the JIH's evolution:
“How on earth could Islam allow voting for taghut (idolatrous parliamentary system)? When I joined the Jamaat, we were told to eliminate taghut, secularism, democracy... everything against the Quran... We joined for iqaamat-e-din. Now the Jamaat is fighting for iqaamat-e-secular democracy. Do you know about the Forum for Democracy and Communal Harmony?... What is it doing? It is fighting for the glory of secularism and democracy. You have also read Maududi. Tell me what has secularism got to do with Islam? Where is the original ideology?” (Ahmad 213)
This
“original ideology” that traditional JIH members nostalgically
reflected upon was further lost as JIH even dropped the phrase
iqaamat-e-deen
from the covers of its publications (Anand). The Jamaat in India was
facing difficulty as it negotiated its identity. It was too late to
backtrack to the days of Mawdudiyat
dominating JIH agenda. And from the early 1990s, Hindu nationalist
politics was gaining popularity. The Jamaat needed to reach out to
Indian Muslims to create a stronger political presence (Khan).
Part
IV. Tactical Reforms: Organizational Successes of JIH
Jamaat-e-Islaami
Hind's pragmatism and willingness to engage the existing Indian
political institutions has afforded it the opportunity to position
sectors of its supporters in specialized organizations – all
working within JIH's framework to oversee and advocate for change. An
examination of JIH's issued resolutions shows that the diversity of
the fields in which JIH sees itself as a potent influence ranges as
widely as the Occupy Wall Street Movement to Palestine to US
sanctions again Iran to the threat of a Naxalite takeover of the
Indian Republic (“Resolutions”). However, the most important of
JIH's associations are domestic and internal to the Muslim community.
JIH presence in organizations such as the All India Muslim Personal
Law Board and Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat ensure that the JIH remains
relevant and accessible within Muslim circles (Ahmad 177, 125).
One of the most
divisive issues of Indian politics in the 1990s was the Babri Masjid
controversy. This issue elevated radical Hindu and Muslim rhetoric in
the nation, though one can argue that the issue was one of
politicians manipulating the people's sentiment. Hindus believed that
the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya sat on top of the location of the
birthplace of Rama – a prominent Hindu deity. And Hindutva
political rhetoric was shepherding many Hindus into joining a
campaign to physically demolish this mosque. In regard to this issue,
the Mushawarat created the Babri Masjid Movement Coalition
Committee. This Committee, headed by two senior Jamaat leaders, best
symbolizes JIH's transition from Islamic rhetoric to rhetoric of
secularism and equality. Unlike other Islamic groups also focusing on
the issue, JIH at the Committee urged Muslims to seek “peaceful,
democratic, and constitutional means” to ensure that justice is
preserved and the mosque is not endangered (Ahmad 211).
Although
the Ayodhya dispute concluded with the victory of the Hindutva
movement and the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the events made a
few points painstakingly clear to JIH. Firstly, JIH could not compete
on the national stage in a nation with a 85% Hindu majority with a
strictly Islamicly appealing platform. JIH could not propagate an
identity based clearly on iqaamat-e-deen,
let alone hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah.
JIH had to appeal to greater values held by Indians across religious,
regional, and socioeconomic barriers (Anand). Secondly, the Jamaat
could not develop the militant face that many of its contemporaries
were developing. Militantism would only alienate JIH from the
majority of Muslims and from those Hindus who also felt that the
Ayodhya dispute had pasted a fascist face on the Indian Republic
(Ahmad 211). Thus, JIH turned towards nationalism and the secular
democracy to justify its role in the Indian policy space – a move
unthinkable to Mawdudi (Ahmad 213).
This
shift toward emphasizing themes of equality, justice, secularism, and
nationalism permitted JIH to expand its mission from creating a
strictly Islamic society to striving for a society organized around
community for all sub-groups. This community-building initiative came
in the form of the Forum for Democracy and Communal Amity (FDCA) as
well as wings of the JIH which concentrated on issues of specific
constituencies (Ahmad 221). Two important wings have been the Girls
Islamic Organization (GIO) and the Student Islamic Organization of
India (SIO). Other than their basic mission of spreading dawah,
these organizations serve as whistle-blowers when they feel that the
government is overstepping its rights in the lives of minorities,
especially Muslims. One such example in which both the GIO and SIO
cooperated in protest was at a college in the southern state of
Karnataka. The college had instated a ban against the burqa on its
campus and the GIO and SIO had allied with secular student unions on
campus to advocate for its repeal (“SIO, GIO”).
This
type of activism from JIH and its wings symbolizes the organization's
efforts to evolve parallel to the ideology and practical quotidian
concerns of its constituency. In its evolution from aiding
Hukuumat-e-ilaahiyah
to acting as the defender of secular democracy in India, JIH has
sought to broaden its appeal in a nation presenting obvious obstacles
to any Islamist organization.
Part
V. Reactions from the Indian State
As
Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind developed from a radical fringe movement of
just a few hundred members to a flagship organization attempting to
represent the multi-faceted nature of Indian Sunni Muslims, one then
naturally wonders how the Indian state responded to this growth in
influence and presence of the JIH. In India, JIH was little threat to
much larger forces of nationalism; however, JIH itself has evolved to
embody these fundamental themes of secularism, democracy, and popular
welfare – albeit from a different background. Therefore, as the
share of the policy space sought by JIH increasingly overlaps with
the those of mainstream parties, the Indian state acts to curb the
influence of any Islamicly-linked organization (Abedin).
In
analyzing “state reactions” the JIH, it is difficult to assume
what constitutes “the state” as India is a fluid democracy with
any number of viewpoints characterizing its different branches and
its different levels of politics. That said, a relationship of
tension between the state and the JIH is especially emphasized during
periods of Islamophobia throughout the country or any political
instability in the government itself. The Indian state has thus
banned JIH twice in its history. The first proscription of JIH
occurred from 1975-1977 when Indira Gandhi banned many organizations,
including the influential Hindutva RSS and the JIH. The second
proscription occurred after the demolition of the Babri Masjid affair
when the RSS was banned once again. In regards to the government's
decision to ban JIH, Mahtab Alam describes the “Politics of the
Ban.” By this, Alam believes that the Indian government is not
necessarily forced to ban JIH because of JIH's actions or ideologies.
Rather, the proscription of JIH is another unfortunate consequence of
Islam as a minority ideology in India (Alam). In these two
situations, the government was primarily concerned about the
dangerous, threatening actions of the RSS. However, the government
felt pressure to ban JIH alongside RSS in order to show impartiality
in Hindu-Muslim strife (Abedin). Moreover, these occurrences also
demonstrate a conflict within branches of the Indian government as
the banning of JIH was later overturned by the judiciary in
Jamaat-e-Islaami
Hind vs Union of India (“Jamaat-e-Islami
Hind”).
Both institutions are striving toward different ends – the
executive seeks political stability; the judiciary seeks legal
consistency.
Conclusion
The
journey of Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind from its beginnings in the 1940s and
1950s to its existence today is a product of three stages of
reformation: ideological reform, policy reform, and tactical reform.
Through these means, the Jamaat has become the symbolic player in the
movement of political Islam in India. More interestingly, JIH has
managed to become relevant in an environment in which it lacks a
magnitude of resources and only a small percentage of the greater
population is Muslim. Therefore, JIH has managed to broaden its
appeal by compromising on the ideals of Mawdudiyat
and
embracing the flexibility of the institutions available. This
decision comes with its advantages and disadvantages. Traditionalists
– such as SIMI4
– lose confidence in the Jamaat and resort to other more extremist
Islamist groups (Khan). On the other hand, the Jamaat presents
pragmatists – such as GIO and SIO members – with opportunities to
engage the system and enact the change they desire. JIH evidently
sees the benefits of democratic engagement to be greater than its
drawbacks. The organization has launched a political party based on
human welfare and secularism and it has designed the “Vision 2016”
program to provide access to crucial necessities to India's poor
minorities, such as Muslims (“JI Hind”). With a viable future
ahead of it, JIH sees itself at the crossroads of many different
political identities. It will be fascinating to see whether JIH and
its subsidiaries will brand themselves as Islamist, Populist,
Communist, or some unique combination of the many choices it has
experimented with over the course of its existence. Regardless, the
pragmatic approach which JIH embodies will cushion its future. All
its eggs are not in a single basket, and Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind is
never afraid to redefine its orientation.
1From
Dar-ul-Kufr to Dar-ul-Islam
2La
illah ila allah wa muhammad rasuul allah
– “There
is no god but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God”
3Idolatrous
system – in Mawdudiyat, loyalty to any “un-Islamic”
institution, such as the secular state, judiciary, government
institutions, etc
4Former
student wing of JIH which was replaced by SIO after SIMI turned to
militantism